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RECENT DECISIONS
in the Baumann case has been severely criticized,19 subsequent New
York decisions have recognized it as precedent, 20 refusing to enjoin
the unauthorized use of a plaintiff's name unless it interfered with a
property right.2 1
To support the injunction granted in the instant case, the court
recognized a property right in a name. In so doing, however, it
merely stated that a wife has "... a property right in the ... pro-
tection of her good name . . " without giving any interpretation
of, or authority for, that phrase.
22
Although it would be difficult to predict the outcome of a future
case on the same facts, this present decision follows an apparent ten-
dency of modern equity to protect personal rights by liberalizing the
traditionally rigid concept of property rights.
M
PRACTICE AND PLEADING- STATUTE OF LImITATIONS - MAL-
PRAcTiE.-Defendant-physician performed two unauthorized opera-
tions on plaintiff, on January 14, 1949, but plaintiff was not informed
of these until January 28, 1949. This malpractice' suit was com-
menced on January 20, 1951. The defendant's motion to dismiss
was granted on the ground that the action was barred by the two
year personal injury statute of limitations.2 The Georgia Court of
19 See Baumann v. Baumann, supra note 18 at 390-5, 165 N. E. at 822-4(dissenting opinions) ; see Niote, 4 ST. JoHN 's L. Rzv. 100 (1929).
20 See Lowe v. Lowe, 241 App. Div. 711, 269 N. Y. Supp. 994 (1st Dep't),
rev'd, 265 N. Y. 197, 192 N. E. 291 (1934); Somberg v. Somberg, 238 App.
Div. 723, 265 N. Y. Supp. 223 (1st Dep't 1933), reefd, 263 N. Y. 1, 188 N. E.
137 (1934); Metlis v. Metlis, 104 N. Y. S. 2d 407 (Sup. Ct. 1951) ; Marquis
v. Marquis, 178 Misc. 702, 35 N. Y. S. 2d 675 (Sup. Ct. 1942); cf. Spitzer
v. Spitzer, 191 Misc. 343, 77 N. Y. S. 2d 279 (Sup. Ct. 1947); Fondiller v.
Fondiller, 182 Misc. 628, 50 N. Y. S. 2d 393 (Sup. Ct. 1944); Kiebler v.
Kiebler, 170 Misc. 81, 9 N. Y. S. 2d 909 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
21 Kranz v. Kranz, 169 Misc. 658, 7 N. Y. S. 2d 830 (Sup. Ct. 1938)
(confusion of names deprived plaintiff of opportunities to obtain gainful
employment).
22 Niver v. Niver, 200 Misc. 993, 995, 111 N. Y. S. 2d 889, 891 (Sup. Ct.
1951).
1 "Malpractice . . . means bad or unskillful practice, resulting in injury
to the patient, and comprises all acts and omissions of a physician or surgeon
as such to a patient as such, which may make the physician or surgeon either
civilly or criminally liable.' H-azoo, MEDICAL JUaRsIrmc 153, § 180
(1931). It has been stated that an unauthorized operation, while an assault
and battery, is also malpractice, even though no negligence is charged. Physi-
cians' and Dentists' Bureau v. Dray, 8 Wash. 2d 38, 111 P. 2d 568 (1941);
see Bakewell v. Kahle, 232 P. 2d 127, 129 (Mont. 1951).
2 The remedy for malpractice in some jurisdictions, including Georgia, lies
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Appeals reversed, and held that, because of the fiduciary relationship
between physician and patient, the non-disclosure of the unauthorized
operations constituted actual fraud, thus bringing the case within the
fraud statute of limitations, which ran from the time plaintiff learned
of the operations. Breedlove v. Aiken, 85 Ga. App. 719, 70 S. E. 2d
85 (1952).
The maximum time within which an action for malpractice must
be commenced in the United States corresponds closely to that limit-
ing other types of personal injury actions such as assault and battery.3
An example of the law prevalent in this country is the New York
statute,4 which provides that a malpractice suit cannot be brought
after two years from the date the cause of action accrues. 5 This
limitation was imposed because of the legislative desire to protect
doctors from a protracted period of uncertainty, during which they
might be sued at any time for occurrences long-since forgotten. 6
A specific act of malpractice may consist of either negligence in
treatment or a deliberate tort.7 Where there is no concealment of
the wrongful act, there is no problem in applying the statute of limi-
tations; but where the tort is fraudulently concealed,8 it is difficult
to determine when the cause of action should accrue. Because of the
fiduciary relationship between doctor and patient,9 New York has
in an action for personal injuries, while in New York and other states, a dis-
tinction is made in the form of the action, and the remedy lies in a suit specifi-
cally for malpractice. See, e.g., GA. Civ. CODE § 3-1004 (1933); ILL. REv.
STAT. c. 83, §24 (1949); N. J. REv. STAT. 2:24-2 (1937); NEB. REv. STAT.§25-208 (1943); N. Y. Cn. PRAc. AcT §50 (1952).
3 See, e.g., CAL. CODE CIv. PRoc. §340 (1951); AN. LAWS MAss. c.
260, § 4 (1932); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 34 (Purdon, 1895); TEX. STAT.
art. 5526 (Vernon, 1948) ; see Physicians' and Dentists' Bureau v. Dray, supra
note 1, 111 P. 2d at 569.
4 Compare N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 50 (1952) ("The following actions
must be commenced within two years after the cause of action has accrued:
"1. An action to recover damages for . . . malpractice.") (emphasis
added), with GA. CrV. CODE § 3-1004 (1933) ("Actions for injuries to the per-
son shall be brought within two years after the right of action accrues ...
(emphasis added).
5 See Barnes v. Gardner, 170 Misc. 604, 606, 9 N. Y. S. 2d 785, 787 (Sup.
Ct. 1939). By way of contrast, the English statute of limitations bars the
action after six years from the date the cause of action accrues, whether the
action be "founded on simple contract or on tort." Limitation Act, 1939, 2 & 3
G-o. 6, c. 21, § 2.6See Albert v. Sherman, 167 Tenn. 133, 67 S. W. 2d 140, 142 (1934).
"Recognition of a contrary rule would permit a plaintiff afflicted with some
malady to trace that malady to an original cause alleged to have accrued years
and years ago. No practicing physician or dentist would ever be safe. The
origin of disease is involved in uncertainty at best."
7 Franklyn v. Peabody, 249 Mich. 363, 228 N. W. 681 (1930); Nolan v.
Kechijian, 75 R. I. 165, 64 A. 2d 866 (1949).
s Brysen v. Aven, 32 Ga. App. 721, 124 S. E. 553 (1924) (syllabus by the
court).
9 Tabor v. Clifton, 63 Ga. App. 768, 12 S. E. 2d 137 (1940) ; see Schmuck-
[ VOL. 27
RECENT DECISIONS
construed a doctor's concealment of an injury to be malpractice, and
therefore subject to the malpractice statute of limitations.10 Thus,
unless the injury is discovered and an action brought before the stat-
ute has run, relief is denied, and the doctor is thereby allowed to take
advantage of his own wrong.'i
To avoid this undesirable result, there have been various at-
tempts to circumvent the statute. New York, following the
minority, 12 permits a patient to sue for breach of contract,13 provided
the complaint is so framed as to state only a cause of action ex
contractu.'4 This remedy affords but partial relief, however, since
recovery is limited to damages naturally flowing from the breach,
and does not compensate for conscious pain and suffering.15 New
York has also allowed an action where the treatments for the same
illness extended beyond the two-year period, and the suit was brought
within two years from the termination of the doctor-patient relation-
ship.' 6 This, too, is an incomplete solution, since it has no effect on
cases where the relationship was not continued subsequent to the
injury.
The construction of the Georgia statute, as followed in the in-
stant case, would seem to be the most practical of any applied by
ing v. Mayo, 183 Minn. 37, 235 N. W. 633 (1931) ; Moses v. Miller, 202 Okla.
605, 216 P. 2d 979, 983 (1950) ; see 21 ST. JoaN's L. REv. 77, 79 (1946).10 Tulloch v. Haselo, 218 App. Div. 313, 218 N. Y. Supp. 139 (3d Dep't
1926). "The failure to speak and to disclose his negligent act was a breach
of duty which constituted malpractice." Id. at 317, 218 N. Y. Supp. at 142;
see PRAsEKER, NEw YORK PRACTIcE 36, 39 (2d ed. 1951).
11 See Schmucking v. Mayo, supra note 9. ". . (A) person should not
be permitted to shield himself behind the statute of limitations where his own
fraud has placed him. He should not be permitted to profit by his own wrong
and it would strike the moral sense strangely to permit him to do so." Id., 235
N. W. at 634; see 16 ST. JOiaN'S L. REv. 101, 103 (1941).
12 See cases collected in Note, 74 A. L. R. 1256 (1931).
13 Conklin v. Draper, 229 App. Div. 227, 241 N. Y. Supp. 529 (1st Dep't),
aff'd, 254 N. Y. 620, 173 N. E. 892 (1930); accord, Keating v. Perkins, 250
App. Div. 9, 293 N. Y. Supp. 197 (1st Dep't 1937); see Frankel v. Wolper,
181 App. Div. 485, 486, 169 N. Y. Supp. 15, 16 (2d Dep't 1918), aff'd, 228
N. Y. 582, 127 N. E. 913 (1920); Monahan v. Devinny, 223 App. Div. 547,
548, 229 N. Y. Supp. 60, 61 (3d Dep't 1928).
14 Allegations as to pain and suffering are unsuited to a contract action and
hence the suit falls into the tort category to which the malpractice statute of
limitations applies. Horowitz v. Bogart, 218 App. Div. 158, 217 N. Y. Supp.
881 (1st Dep't 1926) ; see Monahan v. Devinny, supra note 13.
15 Conklin v. Draper, supra note 13; see Monahan v. Devinny, supra note
13 at 548, 229 N. Y. Supp. at 61; see 1942 LEa. Doc. No. 65(E), 1942 REPORT,
N. Y. LAW REvIsIoN CoMMIssION 167, 172; PRASHKER, NEW YORK PRACTICE
36, 37 (2d ed. 1951).16 Sly v. Van Lengen, 120 Misc. 420, 198 N. Y. Supp. 608 (Sup. Ct. 1923);
Nervick v. Fine, 195 Misc. 464, 87 N. Y. S. 2d 534, aff'd, 275 App. Div. 1043,
91 N. Y. S. 2d 924 (2d Dep't 1949). This rule has been applied in otherjurisdictions. Petrucci v. Heidenreich, 43 Cal. App. 2d 561, 111 P. 2d 421
(1941) ; Thatcher v. DeTar, 351 Mo. 603, 173 S. W. 2d 760 (1943) ; see Ehlen
v. Burrows, 51 Cal. App. 2d 141, 124 P. 2d 82, 84 (1942).
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the courts thus far. Here the court held, that where a duty to speak
exists because of a fiduciary relationship, and there is a concealment
of material facts, the fraud statute of limitations is applicable,17 and
the plaintiff has two years from the date he discovered the injury
within which to bring his action.
New York has tried and rejected this interpretation, on the
theory that it is the malpractice, and not the concealment, which is
the proximate cause of the injury.'8 Although the wording of the
New York fraud 19 and malpractice statutes is such that they would
appear to be open to a judicial interpretation similar to that in the
case under discussion, it is not likely to occur, since it would involve
the overruling of case law, a step the courts are always reluctant
to take.
An alternate solution, suggested by the New York Law Revision
Commission, is a statutory amendment providing that an action may
be commenced within one year after the date of discovery, but not
more than six years after the occurrence of the injury.20 This rec-
ommendation, which would remove the problem from the courts, ap-
pears to be the most comprehensive and satisfactory of any yet pro-
posed.2 ' Not only would it apply to cases where there was no
fraudulent concealment, but it would preserve the original purpose
of the statute-the protection of doctors from an unduly protracted
period of liability. This latter consideration, however, has been weak-
ened by the prevalence of malpractice insurance today.22
It is submitted that the gravity of the problem of fraudulently
concealed malpractice merits the serious attention of both the legis-
17 Brysen v. Aven, 32 Ga. App. 721, 124 S. E. 553 (1924); Buchanan v.
Kull, 323 Mich. 381, 35 N. W. 2d 351 (1949) ; Schmucking v. Mayo, 183 Minn.
37, 235 N. W. 633 (1931).
Is "The concealment alleged is not the wrong which must be made the
gravamen of 'an action to procure a judgment on the ground of fraud' within
Civil Practice Act, section 48." Tulloch v. Haselo, 218 App. Div. 313, 316,
218 N. Y. Supp. 139, 142 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 254 N. Y. 620, 173 N. E. 892
(1930).
19 Compare N. Y. Civ. PRAC. ACT § 48 (1952) ("The following actions must
be commenced within six years after the cause of action has accrued: . . .
5. An action to procure a judgment on the ground of fraud. The cause of
action in such a case is not deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the
plaintiff, or the person under whom he claims, of the facts constituting the
fraud."), udth GA. CIv. CODE § 3-807 (1933) ("If the defendant, or those
under whom he claims, shall have been guilty of a fraud by which the plaintiff
shall have been debarred or deterred from his action, the period of limitations
shall run only from the time of the discovery of the fraud.").
20 See 1942 LEG. Doc. No. 65(E), 1942 REPORT, N. Y. LAW REvIsioN
CoMMISSION 135.
21 "Its purpose is to give to a person injured by malpractice a reasonable
opportunity to discover the facts on which his claim is based, and to require
prompt action on such claim when the facts are discovered." Id. at 136; see
16 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 101, 108 (1941); PRAsHER, NEW YORK PRACTICE 36,
39 (2d ed. 1951).
22 See 21 ST. JOHN'S L. RFv. 77, 79 (1946).
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lature and the courts, to the extent that a prompt attempt should be
made to solve it before the law in this respect becomes merely a tool
to be used by the unscrupulous, to the detriment, not only of those
injured, but of the reputation of the medical profession itself.
PROPERTY-ADVERSE POSSESSION-CLAIM OF RIGHT.-In 1912,
the defendants began to develop and cultivate part of the land ad-
joining their own, although aware that they had no rights there.
Plaintiff purchased this adjoining property in 1947, and then ini-
tiated the present ejectment action. Defendants claimed that they
had title by adverse possession. In reversing the appellate court
decision, the Court of Appeals held that, under the statutes,' there
must be a claim of right, or hostility, in addition to actual occupa-
tion, as evidenced by a sufficient cultivation of the land.2 Van Val-
kenburgh v. Lutz, 304 N. Y. 95, 106 N. E. 2d 28 (1952).3
In England adverse possession commenced under the statute of
Henry III, 4 as a means of getting land into productive use. To ac-
complish this end, the law provided that if a settler would occupy
the premises for a stipulated period he would acquire, for all prac-
tical purposes, a fee simple in the land. The true owner was simul-
taneously penalized if he failed to pursue his remedy within that
1 N. Y. Civ. PRac. AcT § 39 (1952). "Adverse possession under claim of
title not written. Where there has been an actual continued occupation of
premises under a claim of title, exclusive of any other right, but not founded
upon a written instrument or a judgment or decree, the premises so actually
occupied, and no others, are deemed to have been held adversely."
N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT §40 (1952). "Essentials of adverse possession
under claim of title not written." For the purpose of constituting an adverse
possession by a person claiming title not founded upon a written instrument or
a judgment or decree, land is deemed to have been possessed and occupied in
either of the following cases, and no others:
"1. Where it has been protected by a substantial inclosure.
"2. Where it has been usually cultivated and improved."
2 By way of dicta, the court discussed adverse possession through mistaken
entry. It was pointed out that "Lutz himself testified that when he built the
garage he had no survey and thought he was getting it on his own property,
which certainly falls short of establishing that he did it under a claim of title
hostile to the true owner." Van Valkenburgh v. Lutz, 304 N. Y. 95, 99, 106
N. E. 2d 28, 30 (1952). On its face, this statement seems to contradict the
present law. Roulston v. Stewart, 40 App. Div. 200, 57 N. Y. Supp. 1061 (2d
Dep't 1899). It is submitted that what the Court meant was that title to all
the land could not pass where the original entry was by mistake, but only to
that part which was occupied.3 Loughran, Ch. J., Fuld and Desmond, JJ., dissenting.
4WALsH, REAL PROPERTY 783 (2d ed. 1937).
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